The Judgement of The Beautiful
The Judgement of The Beautiful
conjectures about the limits of know- ledge (‘The Transcendental Dialectic). Detailed analysis was Kant’s method. Yes, the process is ponderous. Yes, the sentences are rather convoluted (even in the German). The outcome point is whether Kant extends your ability to make judgements about art. In order to evaluate this, let us consider a key controversial puts forward. argument that Kant ARGUMENT 8.1 The Beautiful is that which pleases universally without requiring a concept 1. The beautiful is the object of an entirely disinterested satisfac- tion – F(last argument) chapter 6 2. There are no private grounds in a disinterested standpoint – A 3. Whenever there are no private grounds, it is reasonable to assume that all react the same way – A 4. All judgements that are grounded in disinterest are in a way) universal for all men (das es einen Grund des Wohlgefallens für jedermann enthalten müsse, Chapter 6, II. 13-14) and this uni- versality does not depend upon the objects but is subjectively universal – 1-4 5. Everyone has his own private feeling of pleasure from sense – A 6. When one judges the beautiful his judgment is for everyone – A 7. Sensations of pleasure may induce valid generalizations, but they are not objective nor subjective universals – A 8. Morality sets universal judgements via concepts
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– F The Beautiful Fins von 162 9. Only aesthetic taste represents the subjective universal – 5-8 10. There is a taste of sense (private judgments) and a taste of reflection (judgements generally held to be true) – A [Sinnen Geschmack v Reflexions Geschmack, Chapter 8, 1.11) 11. Reflective taste rests not on concepts of objects (Begriffen v Objecte, 1.10) because it involves no objective quality of judge- ment (Quantität des Urtheils, 1.11) – A 12. Only reflections that are based upon concepts of objects that represent the quantity of judgement (from the table of judge- ment, 1st Critique) are objective – F 13. The representation (Vorstellung) of pleasure is at best generally valid (Gemeingültigseit); the ethical is an objective universal; and the beautiful is a subjective universal – 9-12 14. If the beautiful were according to the concept, the representa- tion of beauty would be lost (because source would be gone) – F 15. [Without a source, a judgement would lose its authority] – A 16. The judgement of beauty cannot be due to concepts – 14, 15 17. If pleasure from an object preceded our judgement that the object were beautiful, then sensation would rule our judgement – F/Chapter 9 18. Sensation does not rule the judgment of the beautiful – F 19. The judgement of taste concerning the beautiful precedes the pleasure we feel – 17, 18 20. The communicative power in this sort of representation is given by the imagination – F 21. The imagination plays two cognitive roles: (a) in the schematism of concepts and (b) in free-play (cases in which there are no con- cepts) – A (cf. 1st Critique for (a)) 22. The free-play of the imagination is the vehicle by which univer- sal subjective judgements of artistic taste are communicated – 20, 21 23. The ability to communicate the free-play of the imagination (once determined) conveys pleasure – F 24. The judgement of taste once determined by the free-play of the imagination yields pleasure – 19, 22, 23 25. The judgement of taste determines the object in respect of satis- 163 Finding Out What is Beautiful – Modern Theories faction and the predicate of beauty (without a concept) – F 26. The activity of 25 stimulates the understanding in a harmonious activity with the imagination – A 27. The understanding can think about this relation (but this activ- ity is different) – A 28. The understanding can observe that a judgement of taste coincides with the conditions of universality – A 29. [The union with the understanding heightens the dynamic union] – A 30. The understanding works in harmonious concert with the imagi- nation in judgements about the beautiful – 25-29 31. The Beautiful is that which pleases universally without requiring a concept – 9, 13, 16, 19, 24, 30 This is an important argument for Kant. It rests on some controver- sial assumptions. For example, in premise 3, it is assumed that with- out private interests we all react the same way. This assumes that we are all the same (respecting tastes and worldviews). Now this can be understood as: (a) being all the same factually, i.e. we are actually all the same. When Wendy sees x (an artifact or a natural object), then any other person, say Juanita, will automatically judge it the same way – so long that neither party has some vested interest in the artifact or the natural setting. Or it may mean (b) that there is some more general sense that we are all the same – such as being rational animals. But where does this land us? So we are the same on a generic level. So what? How does this ground an aesthetic judgement? Thus, (a) is very implausible. As humans we see more difference than we do similarity. Kant cannot have meant this. But (b) – though it is very plausible – is not very helpful. This is because even if we are the same qua rationality, this does not mean that sans private grounds for self-interest we would all agree that Duchamps’ ‘Nude descending the Staircase’ is beautiful. Or take John Cage’s ‘1’1/2″
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